


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NEW DIMENSIONS IN CANADIAN-SOVIET ARCTIC RELATIONS

by John Hannigan



INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades the Canadian Arctic has witnessed dramatic changes. With the exceptions of defence and sovereignty, the issues arising from these changes have been addressed almost exclusively from a domestic standpoint. More recently, however, there is an emerging trend to view the North in an international context. In general, a mature society assesses its political, economic and social developments in global terms, inviting the forging of international links. The Arctic is no exception. While still in the incipient stages, Canada's northern relations with other Arctic-rim countries have been quietly expanding.

The two countries which figure most prominently in Arctic affairs are Canada and the Soviet Union. Together they comprise about 80 percent of the land mass of the Arctic. The strategic implications of this are well known. It is now time to explore more closely the political, economic and social consequences of this geographic fact. From what has been a traditional focus on the military importance of the Arctic, with decisions and policies flowing from the perceived need to protect ourselves against the Soviet Union, the Arctic is now becoming a centre of attention for cooperation between the two countries. This presents a new set of issues for international peace and security.

The importance of international cooperation in the Arctic has been noted by both countries. On the Canadian side, this was made clear in the December 1986 Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, which stated the government's concurrence with recommendations that called for the development of a northern dimension for Canadian foreign policy, and its commitment to "explore ways of

expanding our bilateral and multilateral relations with all northern states in areas of mutual interest . . ."¹ Similarly, the Soviet Union has called for an increased dialogue on Arctic issues. In October 1987, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev listed six proposals for international cooperation, two in the area of military issues but the remainder dealing with economic, scientific and environmental cooperation.²

With these expressions of interest, the groundwork is being laid for new and expanded Arctic relations between Canada and the USSR. How are the Canadian government's intentions being translated into programmes? To what extent are programmes with the Soviet Union determining the overall northern dimension of Canadian foreign policy? What might be the effect on East-West relations generally and on our relations with the United States? Will activities be significant enough to lead to confidence-building measures in this strategically important region? This paper will address these questions, but it is important to first review the history of Arctic relations between the two countries.

THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN-SOVIET ARCTIC COOPERATION

While Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation at the governmental level is a recent development, the history of discussions on this subject can be traced back to the 1950s. Emerging from the iciest years of the Cold War, East-West relations moved into the mid-1950s with the Spirit of Geneva and the beginning of the Soviet domestic "thaw" under Nikita Khrushchev. At this time, Canadian foreign policy turned toward the guarded possibility of detente with the USSR. Bilateral discussions were held in 1955-56 covering a number of issues. A few months after the October 1955 visit to the Soviet



Union by Lester B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, a trade agreement was signed, and the possibility for cultural exchanges was noted. At the time of Mr. Pearson's visit, mention was also made of possible Arctic cooperation, noting in particular the "exchange of information on scientific research."³

In 1959, around the time that he was presenting his "vision of the North," Prime Minister Diefenbaker stated that the Canadian government had initiated proposals to discuss with the Soviet Union cooperation in the area of "northern research and administration."⁴ It is interesting to note that, at the time of these proposals, the Canadian government stressed its interest in the social as well as the technical sciences for any cooperative projects. Soviet officials balked at the suggestions for including social sciences. More important, the Soviet Union was not prepared, for security reasons, to allow Canadian scientists, be they sociologists or geologists, to travel in the Soviet North.

During the 1960s, there was not very much activity to follow up these proposals with one major exception, which is believed by some to have been a turning point in the Soviet attitude toward Arctic cooperation. This was the exchange of Ministerial delegations in 1965, when for the first time a group of Canadian government officials and scientists travelled in the Soviet Arctic. At the time, it was believed that the visits created a climate for closer scientific cooperation on Arctic-related issues.⁵ Despite these intentions, there was a hiatus of six years before a flurry of activity in Canadian-Soviet relations in the early 1970s, which included a significant step in the area of Arctic cooperation. During the May 1971 visit of Prime Minister Trudeau to the Soviet Union, Soviet Premier Kosygin expressed interest in the possibility of exchanging information on experiences in economic development, including those related to northern regions.⁶ Shortly thereafter, another exchange of Ministerial delegations took place. The Canadian delegation, led by Jean Chrétien, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, visited several Soviet cities and towns in the Soviet Arctic. While there, Mr. Chrétien noted Canada's desire to have an exchange of scientists specializing in Arctic issues, a point which was reiterated by the head of the visiting Soviet delegation to Canada a few months later.⁷ While this increased contact was paving the way for a programme of exchanges on Arctic-related issues, an institutional framework for bilateral relations was being implemented under which this type of cooperation could take place. Two major agreements governing Canadian-Soviet relations were signed in 1971: the Agreement on Cooperation in the Industrial Application of Science and Technology in January and the General Exchanges Agreement in October.

With these Agreements in place, and in the prevailing spirit of cooperation, discussions were held between Canadian and Soviet officials in February and November of 1972 to try to agree on specific areas of scientific

cooperation, which included technical sciences such as geology, hydrology, meteorology, and ecology, plus research on social issues in respect of northern native people. Memoranda of Understanding were signed on both occasions, but when it came time to detail research programmes, the Soviets refused to include subjects related to the social sciences. The Canadian side responded that, without the inclusion of research on the social sciences, none of the programmes would be implemented. A series of meetings and diplomatic correspondence could not persuade the Soviet negotiators to change their position and by 1975 talks on the northern dimension of Canadian-Soviet cooperation, which many believed to have held such promise, had reached an impasse.

Four years later, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the Canadian government suspended all government-funded programmes of cooperation with the Soviet Union under extant bilateral agreements, it seemed as though all discussions and negotiations on Arctic cooperation were about to be put to rest. But then, in late 1981 and early 1982, events took a rather unexpected turn. Coinciding with a reassessment by the Canadian government regarding its overall relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviets submitted a proposal for scientific cooperation on Arctic issues, including "possible cooperation in the social and ethnographic aspects of northern development." Canadian insistence on social science research had finally triumphed over Soviet reluctance.

CURRENT GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES

Despite the frustrations of ten years of unsuccessful negotiations, the lure of the Arctic was still alive, and the Canadian government responded positively to the Soviet request to reopen discussions. The subsequent round of meetings — March 1983 in Ottawa and April 1984 in Moscow — were successful. On 16 April 1984 a Protocol of Canadian-Soviet Consultations on the Development of a Programme of Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Arctic and the North was signed. Attached to this Protocol was a programme of cooperative projects in four main subject areas: geoscience and Arctic petroleum; northern environment; northern construction; and ethnography and education. In total, there were eighteen topics for cooperation, several with sub-topics, each envisaging an exchange of scientists and/or information. In the two- to three-year period of exchange activity under the 1984 Protocol, fourteen Canadian delegations visited the USSR, each for a period of approximately one to two weeks, with fifteen Soviet delegations coming to Canada for similar periods. In all, eighty specialists took part.

When the Protocol was being renegotiated in February 1987, both sides expressed their satisfaction with progress, and as a signal of their continuing commitment to the programme, expanded the number of topics from eighteen to thirty within the same four major scientific themes. In



addition, the nature of cooperation was expanded from exchange of data and scientists to include the possibility of joint research projects. Under the current programme of exchanges, six Canadian delegations have visited the USSR and five Soviet delegations have come to Canada.⁹

The climate for pursuing further cooperation in the Arctic was aided by the visit to the Soviet Union in May/June 1986 of a Canadian delegation led by David Crombie, then Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. During this visit Mr. Crombie had meetings with the Soviet minister and senior officials responsible for the Canada-Soviet Arctic Science Exchange where he expressed overall satisfaction with the programme and a desire to continue the exchange of scientists. Mr. Crombie also noted that the Canadian side would be interested in expanding cooperation into areas such as economic development.

During the period leading up to the February 1987 round of negotiations, the Soviet Union submitted to the Canadian government a draft text of a full-scale

Agreement on Arctic Cooperation. In principle the Canadian government had no strong objections to raising the status of cooperation from the level of a Protocol to that of an Agreement as this would open the door for a wider scope of Arctic-related activity, e.g., academic, cultural and economic. However, after seven months, when no official response was forthcoming from the Canadian government, the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa decided to make public the text of the proposed Agreement. Through the offices of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee in Ottawa, the Soviet draft was publicized.¹⁰ At the same time, Soviet Embassy officials remarked that the Department of External Affairs was intentionally stalling on this issue, and even cited the likelihood of obstruction by the United States. For evidence they cited the fact that Canada and the United States were then in the midst of discussions to conclude a bilateral Arctic Treaty. Circumstantial evidence led the Soviet officials to conclude that within the context of Canadian-American talks on Arctic cooperation, the

Department of External Affairs was being pressured not to respond to the Soviet proposal.

In fact, the seven months which had elapsed between the submission and publication of the draft text were taken up by normal bureaucratic procedures and attempts at interdepartmental coordination rather than by any diplomatic chicanery. The Soviet move of going public with their comments was inept. In a letter to *The Globe and Mail*, the Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed his displeasure over this Soviet manoeuvring.¹¹ The incident did not, however, change the Canadian government's commitment to respond to the Soviet proposal. In a more recent letter to the editor of *The Globe and Mail*, Mr. Clark noted: "We are nearing completion of a review of the Soviet proposal for a bilateral treaty on Arctic cooperation and expect to respond in the near future."¹²

OTHER ARCTIC-RELATED ACTIVITY

In addition to the federal government's moves to expand the scope of its bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union on Arctic issues, there has been a number of other examples of Arctic-related activities involving the two countries. These have been undertaken for the most part without direct federal government involvement, although there was some administrative and financial assistance from the Departments of External Affairs, and Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

- In 1986 a programme of scientific and technical cooperation was concluded between the governments of Quebec and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Nine areas of research were outlined, most of which had a northern focus. This programme is still active.
- In the summer and fall of 1987 there was an exchange of Ministers from the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Possibilities for cooperation in the areas of education of northern native people and northern construction were discussed.
- In the cultural sphere, the possibility for increased contacts between native people appears more promising than it has for many years. In June 1987 a Soviet Chuckchi dance group performed at an international folklore festival in Vancouver. An invitation has been sent to the Soviet Union by Inuit Tapirisat of Canada to have Soviet Yuit (Inuit) attend the Canadian-sponsored Inuit Youth Camp. Although previous invitations have never been answered, there are now indications that Soviet authorities may be prepared to send participants in the future. The Canadian Inuit Broadcasting Corporation has had correspondence with the Soviet State Committee for Television and Radio about the possibility for joint filming in the Soviet and Canadian Arctic.
- One of the most publicized Arctic ventures was the transpolar ski trek, called the "Polar Bridge." A

thirteen-member Canadian-Soviet team skied from Novaya Zemlya in the Soviet Arctic across the North Pole to Cape Columbia on Ellesmere Island. While predominantly an expedition, the team conducted scientific experiments as well.

- Canada and the Soviet Union participated in a round of multilateral discussions at the end of March 1988 in Stockholm, the purpose of which was to lay the groundwork for the establishment of an International Arctic Science Committee.
- In the academic sphere, discussions will take place in 1988 between representatives of Canadian and Soviet universities to establish contacts and a possible exchange between universities in Canada and the Soviet Union which specialize in northern and Arctic studies. In the fall of 1987 a Canadian Inuk spent four months in the Faculty of Northern Peoples at Leningrad's Herzen Institute under the aegis of the Canada-USSR academic exchange programme.

As is apparent from this list of activities, the recent trend is toward expanding Arctic cooperation in a number of different areas. While many do not entail direct federal government involvement, they all have materialized, at least in part, as the result of expanding intergovernmental contacts at the federal level. First and foremost, the federal government's commitment to foster contacts with the USSR on Arctic issues has been translated into practice through the renewal and expansion of the Programme of Arctic Science Exchanges. In addition, the increased dialogue and contacts with Soviet counterparts engendered by that Programme have led to the broadening of relations in other areas.

CIRCUMPOLAR COOPERATION AND CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The expansion of Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation in this broad range of subjects has created a new challenge for Canadian foreign policy. Largely because of our expanding relations with the Soviet Union, the Arctic is now a region where non-military cooperation joins the more traditional military strategic focus. This changing northern dimension has attracted considerable attention in the past two years, especially after it was highlighted as a separate chapter in the Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations.¹³ The theme was subsequently taken up in a Report of a Working Group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs entitled *The North and Canada's International Relations*. The gist of the recommendations in these two reports is on the one hand to examine closely our security needs in the Arctic while on the other hand to work toward expanding non-military cooperation with other Arctic countries including the Soviet Union.

These suggestions pose some specific challenges when considering relations with the Soviet Union. One must always be cognizant of Soviet intentions for developing

cooperation with specific countries in specific areas. In the case of Arctic relations with Canada, the Soviet Union is undoubtedly hoping that cooperation in non-military areas will have an impact on furthering its proposals for demilitarization in the Arctic. In a February 1988 appeal to the parliaments and parliamentarians of northern countries, the Soviet Union stated its desire to turn "the areas inside and near the Arctic Circle of our planet into a genuine peace zone."¹⁴ Security issues are to be discussed at the negotiating table along with other areas of mutual concern such as "the economy, ecology, science, etc."¹⁵ In other words, the Soviet Union sees all aspects of Arctic cooperation as intricately interconnected.

As regards Arctic cooperation with the Soviet Union, the targeting process in thematic areas has, to a certain extent, been followed. As a result, several direct benefits for Canada can be identified. In the scientific areas it appears that most of the gains are going to be in the more theoretical aspects of basic and applied science. In the more practical fields of engineering and the application of technologies, Canada is further advanced than the USSR. But even here there are potential tangible spin-off benefits, since it is thought by many that this lead can be translated into commercial contracts for Canadian firms in the near future. With respect to exchanges in the field of education, there have been some limited benefits from exposure to Soviet programmes in the area of native language instruction and protection of the native culture. Opening up possibilities for Canadian Inuit to have contact with Soviet Yuit is an important cultural development which could soon progress into new areas such as exchanges of native craftspeople.

An assessment of this cooperation in terms of national interest should not be restricted to an appraisal of those benefits which directly flow from the exchange of information. There are also less tangible, indirect benefits such as the general support it lends toward engaging the Soviet Union in multilateral initiatives. Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation has undoubtedly influenced the recent Soviet decision to participate in international meetings to establish an International Arctic Science Committee which may study and make resolutions regarding protection of the Arctic environment. Helping to overcome a traditional Soviet reluctance to be part of such international undertakings should be viewed as a major benefit.¹⁶

While the benefits of Canadian-Soviet cooperation are identifiable and will undoubtedly continue to increase in the future, they have been realized within a policy vacuum. There has not been a clear statement from the government about the specific areas of cooperation which should be fostered and the objectives of that cooperation. Neither has there been an indication of which countries hold the greatest promise for fulfilling goals in particular fields.

The call for greater clarity in our northern foreign policy is an old theme. There is, however, a new element

which makes the formulation of a northern foreign policy more of an imperative now than before: the number of actors in circumpolar cooperation is expanding. In addition to the role which the Inuit Circumpolar Conference¹⁷ has played over the past decade in formulating Arctic policies, the Territorial governments are now pursuing strategies for greater direct involvement in circumpolar cooperation.

To understand this new dimension, one must turn to the domestic sphere and the process of political development in the Territories. In the ongoing process of devolving powers from the federal government to the Territories, the governments of Yukon and the Northwest Territories are developing new policy initiatives which they believe will further their social, cultural, economic and political development. They see circumpolar cooperation as one area where a more active role can be taken. In so doing they are saying, among other things, that the federal government has been too slow in responding to their needs.

In the February 1988 policy paper of the government of the Northwest Territories entitled "Direction for the 1990s," a separate section is devoted to international relations. The Northwest Territories is setting out to establish its place in the world. In the policy paper it is stated that: "The Northwest Territories is a full participant in the circumpolar world. Our people and our government are leading actors in many of the events and issues which shape international polar activities."¹⁸ Subsequent to the release of this policy paper the government of the Northwest Territories announced that it would be giving their Ottawa office new responsibility to "develop more productive links with circumpolar nations."¹⁹

That the Northwest Territories has adopted such an active policy toward the expansion of circumpolar relations is indicative of the growing importance which northerners are placing on the international component of their social and economic development. As noted above, the government of Quebec has already concluded a programme of exchanges with the Russian Republic which has a predominantly northern focus. It may only be a matter of time before the Northwest Territories seeks its own bilateral programme with a Soviet republic or with other circumpolar countries.

These developments point to the immediate need for an articulated foreign policy in the area of circumpolar relations. There is simply too much happening on a number of different fronts to continue on an *ad hoc* basis. The fact that so much of the activity is currently taking place with the Soviet Union is added impetus to formulate a circumpolar strategy.

THE EAST-WEST AND CANADA-US DIMENSIONS

Formulation of the northern dimension of our foreign policy must take into account the fact that the Arctic is

becoming an increasingly important focus of East-West relations. However, it should be emphasized that this importance stems from strategic considerations. Non-military Arctic cooperation with the Soviet Union has little impact on the course of East-West relations. On the other hand, if this dialogue and cooperation contribute toward a climate which is conducive to the discussion of strategic issues such as Arctic arms control and confidence-building measures then so much the better.²⁰ At the same time, one should be realistic about such possibilities and not ascribe to this cooperation an impact far beyond its potential.

There are of course areas where non-military and military issues will conflict. For example, potential economic cooperation in Soviet offshore oil development in the Barents Sea may be restricted by Soviet strategic concerns. Where such conflicts occur, Arctic cooperation will be a more visible component of East-West relations. However, in general terms, Soviet participation in areas of Arctic cooperation such as science and the environment should not raise concerns or create any problems in the realm of military/strategic relations with our NATO allies. Most important, it should not have any significant effect on our bilateral relations with the United States.

The one area of non-military cooperation with the Soviet Union which could create friction in Canada-US relations relates to jurisdiction over Arctic archipelagic waters. However, there is little likelihood that a bilateral agreement between Canada and the Soviet Union would mention this subject. Both countries have drawn straight baselines around their respective Arctic archipelagoes, thereby designating the enclosed waters as internal. The Soviet Union has already publicly acknowledged its agreement with Canada's decision to do this. This topic should not emerge as a factor in Canadian-Soviet bilateral relations.

In keeping with its priorities in Arctic policy, which include the development of international links, the United States is currently as likely as not to encourage Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation, particularly in those areas where the United States has direct concerns, such as the Arctic environment. To illustrate the extent of current American interest in this area, issues related to US-Soviet Arctic cooperation were on the agenda during the Reagan-Gorbachev Washington summit of December 1987.²¹ This led to two agreements on Arctic relations contained in the communiqué of the Moscow summit in May/June 1988. The United States also participated at the recent meetings in Stockholm concerning the establishment of an International Arctic Science Agreement. It is not unlikely that in the near future Canada may even begin to lag behind the United States in terms of pursuing new initiatives for Arctic cooperation with the Soviet Union. There is, therefore, little to be concerned about in terms of any potentially adverse effect Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation may have on Canadian-US relations.

CONCLUSION

There are two new dimensions in Canadian-Soviet Arctic relations. First, the signing of the programme of scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union and other initiatives in bilateral Arctic cooperation have tended to focus more attention on the Arctic as a theatre of scientific, environmental, cultural and economic cooperation. This has broadened the international aspects of Arctic development from the traditional military strategic arena to include relations in the non-military sphere. This development has created some new challenges for Canadian foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.

The Soviet approach of combining military issues and non-military aspects of Arctic cooperation can be counter-productive. For the Canadian government, it would be more sensible to address these two issues separately. If viewed in a parallel way, lack of progress in the military/strategic arena will not impede potential cooperation in non-military areas. Although each set of relations would not proceed in a vacuum, the two should not be directly linked. This of course presupposes a continuation of East-West relations along the current line of attempts to reduce tensions.

Another reason for making this distinction is to help clarify the needs and priorities of Canadian foreign policy in this area. The federal government has a responsibility to create a climate wherein northerners can pursue their social, cultural and economic development through the forging of international links. Programmes of cooperation should be concluded with whichever circumpolar country offers the greatest potential benefits. The specific areas of cooperation should be developed with individual countries in a way which reflects our national interest, the formulation of which should incorporate a strong input from northerners. In science, for example, the most important areas for cooperation should first be set thematically and ranked in terms of national priorities. Only then should approaches be made to those countries which would provide the most advantageous relationship in those targeted areas. This process should be replicated in other fields of potential cooperation such as education and commerce. In the cultural sphere, ethnic affinity would be an important determinant in establishing international exchanges.

By not linking it with issues such as Arctic arms control and demilitarization, Arctic cooperation with the Soviet Union can be viewed in a more realistic perspective. Specific actions such as Canada's decision to upgrade its defence capability in the Arctic, including the acquisition of ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines over the next twenty years, should not have any repercussions on Canadian-Soviet scientific or cultural cooperation in the Arctic. In the longer run, this approach may even prove to be more beneficial with respect to strategic considerations in that it can create a more conducive climate for negotiations in areas such as Arctic arms control.

From the development of Arctic relations with the

Soviet Union at the intergovernmental level has flowed a significant amount of activity by actors other than the federal government (provincial and territorial governments, universities, native organizations and private groups). This constitutes the second new dimension of Canadian-Soviet Arctic relations: actors outside of the federal government are pursuing their own initiatives for Arctic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Despite the implications which this development has for Canadian foreign policy in general, there has been no concerted attempt on the part of the Canadian government to formulate a policy which better identifies all of our needs in circumpolar cooperation. The federal government should be working toward the creation of a policy framework within which all the various aspects of Arctic cooperation are ascribed priorities and where the mechanisms for achieving objectives in each area are outlined. At the same time, the goals of Arctic cooperation in specific areas should be matched with those countries where the realization of potential benefits are deemed to be the greatest. Distinctions should also be made between pursuing cooperation on a bilateral or multilateral level. All of this must take into account the needs of northerners and the national interest.

It has been almost two years since the federal government stated that it "recognizes the importance of developing a coherent set of policies for the Arctic, including foreign policy."²² To date there is little indication that it has moved beyond the point of recognition to the stage of beginning to formulate such a policy. Perhaps the recent developments in Canadian-Soviet Arctic relations which have been outlined in this paper will provide an additional impetus to address the issue of Canada's northern foreign policy.

NOTES

1. *Canada's International Relations*, Response of the Government of Canada to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons, Presented by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, December 1986, p. 86.
2. Speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the presentation of the Order of Lenin and Gold Medal in Murmansk, 1 October 1987. English translation provided by Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, *Soviet Union: National Affairs*, FBIS-SOV-87-191, 2 October 1987, pp. 41-42.
3. As cited in R.A.J. Phillips, "Canada and Russia in the Arctic," *Behind the Headlines*, Vol. XVI, No. 4, October 1956, p. 11.
4. As cited in Jocelyn M. Ghent, "Cooperation in Science and Technology," in *Canadian-Soviet Relations, 1939-1980*, edited by Aloysius Balawyder, Mosaic Press, Oakville, 1981, p. 180.
5. See: G.W. Rowley, "International Scientific Relations in the Arctic," in *The Arctic Frontier*, edited by R. St. J. MacDonald, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1966, p. 290. Mr. Rowley was a member of the Canadian delegation.
6. See: Carl H. McMillan, "Canada's Postwar Economic Relations with the USSR — An Appraisal," in Balawyder, *op. cit.*, 1981, p. 136.
7. Walter Slipchenko, *Siberia 1971*, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1971. Mr. Slipchenko was a member of the Canadian delegation visiting the Soviet Union and accompanied the Soviet delegation visiting Canada.
8. Quoted in Walter Slipchenko, "Canada-USSR Arctic Science Exchange Programme: An Historical Perspective of Cooperation in the Arctic," paper presented at the Soviet Maritime Arctic Workshop, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, 10-13 May 1987, p. 12.
9. This information is current as of mid-April 1988. Details on exchange activity were provided by Mr. Walter Slipchenko of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, the Canadian coordinator of this Exchange Programme.
10. John Merritt, "Has Glasnost Come Knocking?" *Northern Perspectives*, special edition, October 1987.
11. "Arctic Cooperation," *The Globe and Mail*, 12 October 1987. Letter to the editor signed by Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs.
12. "Arctic ball in Soviets' court," *The Globe and Mail*, 6 April 1988. Letter to the editor signed by Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs.
13. *Independence and Internationalism*, Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on Canada's International Relations, Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, June 1986, pp. 127-135.
14. "Appeal to Parliaments and Parliamentarians," *News Release*, Press Office of the USSR Embassy in Canada, No. 10, 12 February 1988.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
16. Of course the changes in leadership and domestic policies in the Soviet Union are primary reasons for this changed attitude. It should be pointed out, though, that when General Secretary Gorbachev proposed in his Murmansk speech an international conference to examine possibilities for the creation of a multilateral Arctic Science Council (which should be viewed as a

Soviet response to an extant Western proposal rather than a Soviet initiative), he preceded this statement by specifically referring to the programme of scientific cooperation with Canada.

17. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference was established in 1977 as an international assembly of Inuit from Canada, Alaska and Greenland. Although invited, Soviet Yuit have never attended. The Conference meets in plenum once every three years to agree on Arctic-related policies which reflect the interests of the Inuit. There is a permanent secretariat and the current president is Canadian.
18. *Direction for the 1990s*, Government of the Northwest Territories, February 1988.
19. Statement by Mr. Dennis Patterson, Government Leader for the Northwest Territories, to the Legislative Assembly on 15 April 1988.
20. For a discussion of prospects in this area, see: Ronald G. Purver, *Arctic Arms Control: Constraints and Opportunities*, Occasional Paper No. 3, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa, February 1988.
21. Cheryl Sullivan, "Summit May Start to Defrost a Cold, Cold Border," *Christian Science Monitor*, 14-20 December 1987.
22. "Canada's International Relations: Response . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 85.

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Published by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. Additional copies are available from the Institute: Constitution Square, 360 Albert Street, Suite 900, Ottawa, Ontario, K1R 7X7.

Le présent exposé est également publié en français.
ISBN: 0-662-16530-6